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The Post-Cold War enlargement of NATO, in two rounds so far, was the biggest 
and the most important geopolitical change in Europe, after the geopolitical transition 
that took place in Europe from 1989 to 1991. A third round of the enlargement, which 
includes Croatia and Albania, was opened at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, 
by sending invitations to these two states. Enlargement was and still is a part of NATO’s 
transformation in the Post-Cold War Era in which NATO has evolved from a traditional 
form of military-political alliance into a combination of an alliance and security community. 
It also was and still is an expression of American triumph in the Cold War and the rising 
of the USA to a status of the world’s only superpower. NATO has enlarged its territorial 
reach, changed its missions, capabilities and objectives, and is continuing to modify 
them so that it could stay prepared for the future security challenges facing its members. 
The biggest challenge facing NATO in the future may be coming from the inside – the 
possibility of becoming a tool of USA’s global geostrategy and its aims. If NATO wants 
to remain a legitimate alliance and develop itself towards the security community, it must 
not become a tool for fulfilling the geopolitical and geostrategic goals of only one state, not 
even the USA. Therefore, a balanced approach in American-European relations is needed, 
according to which the USA would not use its military power to impose its geopolitical 
and geostrategic objectives at any cost.
Key words: NATO, geopolitical objectives, geostrategic objectives, Post-Cold War 
Era, United States of America, Europe
Proširenje NATO-a: Geopolitička pobjeda SAD-a u post 
hladnoratovskom razdoblju? Rezultati i perspektive
Post hladnoratovsko proširenje NATO-a, u dosad provedena dva kruga, predstavlja 
najveću i najvažniju geopolitičku promjenu u Europi, nakon geopolitičke tranzicije koja 
se u Europi odigrala u razdoblju od 1989. do 1991. g. Treći krug proširenja, koji uključuje 
Hrvatsku i Albaniju, otvoren je davanjem pozivnica ovim državama na Summitu NATO-a 
u Bukureštu u travnju 2008. g. Proširenje je bilo i još uvijek jest dio preobrazbe NATO-a 
u post hladnoratovskom razdoblju u kojem je NATO evoluirao iz tradicionalnog vojno-
političkog saveza u kombinaciju saveza i sigurnosne zajednice. Proširenje je također bilo i 
jest izraz američke pobjede u hladnom ratu i uzdizanja SAD-a u jedinu svjetsku supersilu. 
NATO je povećao svoj teritorijalni obuhvat, promijenio svoje misije, sposobnosti i ciljeve, 
te ih nastavlja mijenjati kako bi ostao spreman odgovoriti na buduće sigurnosne izazove 
koji se postavljaju pred njegove članice. Najveći izazov NATO-u u budućnosti mogao bi 
doći iznutra, a to je mogućnost da postane sredstvo američke globalne geostrategije i njenih 
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ciljeva. Ako NATO želi ostati legitimnim savezom i izrastati u sigurnosnu zajednicu, ne 
smije postati sredstvo za ispunjavanje geopolitičkih i geostrateških ciljeva samo jedne 
države, pa čak ni SAD-a. Stoga je u odnosima SAD-a i Europe potreban uravnotežen 
pristup, prema kojem SAD ne bi koristile vojnu moć kako bi nametale svoje geopolitičke 
i geostrateške ciljeve pod svaku cijenu.
Ključne riječi: NATO, geopolitički ciljevi, geostrateški ciljevi, post hladnoratovsko 
razdoblje, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Europa
INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, as we will refer to it in this article), 
has continued its existence in the Post-Cold War Era, as a subject i.e. player in the new 
geopolitical world-order, as a combination of military alliance and security community. 
The main cause of NATO’s founding and existence for forty years since its founding, 
The Warsaw Treaty had been dissolved (formally signed in 1955, but the communist bloc 
existed in 1949, when NATO was founded) in 1991. But NATO continued to exist, and 
it continued to enlarge its membership, at the same time transforming itself to adapt to 
the new conditions in the international arena. What is more important, it has continued to 
fulfill its missions, especially the new ones. This fact could be considered surprising, if 
we did not know that NATO’s members thought it was more useful and efficient to keep 
NATO alive, than to dissolve it. 
The Soviet Union, which ceased to exist in 1991, lost control of Central and Eastern 
Europe, even before it dissolved. The Warsaw Treaty was formally dissolved in 1991; the 
communist ideology was no longer the ruling ideology in the states that used to be parts 
of the Eastern bloc. The threat of total nuclear warfare was brought from a considerable 
to a minimal certainty. The successor states of the former Soviet Union were not nearly as 
powerful, as the former Soviet Union at the peak of its power. Also, they were not hostile 
toward NATO. Russia had a lot of internal economic, political and economic problems 
during the whole nineties. It needed all the help it could get from the West, as well as 
other states that evolved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The USA remained the 
only superpower, and a completely new era of geopolitical and international relations has 
evolved. A new geopolitical world-order, as we call it, since it has not been named properly, 
started to evolve. It could be called an American geopolitical world-order, because of the 
overwhelming predominance of the USA in geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic 
relations. The new world-order is marked by globalization and a predominance of market 
economy. All the changes that we have mentioned were powerful factors that could have 
brought the purpose of NATO’s existence into question. 
THE DEBATES ABOUT NATO’S FUTURE
At that time, parts of the academic community and public opinion considered NATO 
to be a relic of the Cold War Era, and made public appeals to politicians to dissolve NATO. 
They believed that the new system of Euroatlantic security should be established around 
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the Organization (then Conference) for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Contrary to 
this, at the time of the dissolution of Warsaw Treaty, every opinion that considered the 
further existence of NATO redundant, did not find any substantiating support among the 
political elites of NATO members. The reasons were various. The unification of Germany 
and its continued membership as a unified country was a huge political victory for NATO 
and a first pointer that the victory in Cold War is possible and close. New threats and 
challenges occurred in Central, Eastern and especially Southeastern Europe after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. By this, we refer to ethnic 
hatred, ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes which were suppressed for a long time. As 
a consequence, areas of violence and instability occurred in the former Soviet Union and 
in former Yugoslavia. In most cases, economic crises and the instability of just recently 
established and weak institutions, which were not following democratic standards, caused 
the risk of internal chaos and international conflicts to become very real. Besides that, 
Russia became a huge problem, a nuclear superpower, torn by internal instability, whose 
economy was ruined, and the living standard of Russian nation plummeted. The perception 
of Russia as a threat to security was that Russia posed no military threat to the security 
of the West. However, Central and East European states perceived Russia as a threat, due 
to geographical proximity and painful experiences from the past. When the Eastern bloc 
ceased to exist, Poland and the three Baltic states especially, found themselves in a security 
vacuum, without any institutionalized security arrangements. Therefore, they wanted and 
needed security guarantees from NATO, as full members of the Alliance, as a guarantee 
towards a possible Russian neo-imperialism. (Brzezinski 1998)
Debates that were conducted in the scientific communities and among the politi-
cal elites of the NATO member states concluded that NATO was best prepared for the 
whole spectrum of security threats that the West was facing in the Post-Cold War Era. 
However, that does not mean that the enlargement did not suffer strong opposition among 
the intellectual elites of the West, especially in the USA. They thought that enlargement 
will only antagonize Russia, that the Russian new nationalism and imperialism will grow 
stronger because of NATO’s march to the East and that the new members cannot bring 
any more security to the Alliance. Enlargement faced a strong opposition from both 
liberal institutionalists and from conservative realists, which represent both sides of the 
spectrum of international relations theories. Of course, each group had different reasons 
for opposing the enlargement, but in the focus of both opinions was Russia as a nuclear 
superpower and a super problem that needs to be dealt with special care. (Mandelbaum 1995, 
Brown 1995)
The opinion that prevailed after a long and profound debate, and later became a 
mainstream opinion and doctrine of NATO, was: The new era brings with itself new 
challenges which demand the new missions, but NATO has every reason to continue 
its existence. The events that occurred during the geopolitical transition, from 1989 to 
1991, after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe gave confirmation of their beliefs 
to those who thought that NATO should survive and the members were more secure 
if they continued to be members of NATO. However, the opinion that NATO should 
transform itself in accordance with new challenges and conditions, also found its ground. 
(Weber 1992, Risse-Kappen 1996)
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At the beginning of Clinton‘s first term as President of the USA, people who did not 
share his beliefs about NATO enlargement represented a majority of the Administration. 
They thought that the policy towards Russia was more important and that this was of primary 
foreign national interest of the USA. They believed that even a plan to enlarge NATO would 
have made undemocratic tendencies in Russia stronger, and made organized opposition 
towards the West among the strongest political power in Russia. (Carter, Perry 1999)
Opponents to NATO enlargement were also present in the State Department, and 
they thought that NATO was so far the most important success of American policy in 
Europe. The enlargement would increase its responsibilities, and would not increase its 
capabilities. Besides, European allies were not perceived to be very interested in enlarge-
ment. (Asmus 2002)
In opposition to those who wanted to avoid the debate about enlargement, there were 
the supporters of the enlargement who wanted a public debate to take place. They thought 
that the enlargement was part of a broader transformation of the Alliance in accordance 
with the new challenges and new mission. The importance of the US role in NATO was a 
key factor for the enlargement, and the public debate was going on in the USA.
CHALLENGES TO THE ENLARGEMENT – INFLUENCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND BALKAN WARS
Besides the challenges that were brought in front of NATO as a result of the geopolitical, 
geostrategic and geoeconomic changes in Europe and the World, the problem of defining 
internal relations among the members of NATO and the relationship between NATO and 
the EU was significant for the future of NATO, the EU, transatlantic relations, European 
and Euroatlantic security. The biggest internal problem, like many times before in the 
history of NATO, was the relationship between the USA (which always had the support 
of Great Britain) and France and to some degree Germany. The enemy that was the cause 
of founding the Alliance and its survival during the four decades of the Cold War was 
gone. Geostrategic relations had changed irreversibly, and this change had brought the 
survival of NATO in question. This change also signified the basics of NATO’s complete 
transformation, which started at the end of the geopolitical transition, as a reaction to the 
beginning of new era in international relations and a new geopolitical world-order. 
Transformation of NATO as a main goal of the Alliance can be found in all the official 
documents from NATO Summits, from the Summit of Rome in 1991, to the Summit of 
Riga, held in 2006. The enlargement was one of the elements of transformation of NATO 
itself, and it is also one of the main geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of NATO. Part 
of this transformation was a significant reduction of NATO’s defense spending and defense 
spending of every NATO member. But before the enlargement could start, NATO had to 
show that it was capable to function in the new geostrategic relations, and that it was able 
to shape the new security architecture in Europe and its border regions. At the same time 
it had to adapt itself to the new strategic and political conditions. (Cornish 1996)
In accordance with the cooperation of NATO and the EU, NATO enlargement posed 
and continues to pose substantial implications for the EU. Out of 27 members of the EU 
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and 26 members of NATO, 21 states are members of both organizations. If we take into 
account that two NATO member states are geographically located in North America, and 
Turkey as a NATO member state also wants to join the EU for a long time, we can see 
that membership in NATO and the EU is a complementary issue. All states of the former 
Eastern bloc that joined NATO so far have joined the EU.
The influence of wars in the Balkans was also significant for NATO’s transformation. 
Wars in former Yugoslavia were perceived as a renewal of old, medieval conflicts and 
hatred, which resurfaced after the collapse of geopolitical stability and balance of power in 
Europe. All these conflicts were fought at the borders of unified and wealthy Europe. The 
conflict that showed how powerless NATO was, and did not act to stop the bloodshed in 
Europe, was the conflict in former Yugoslavia. NATO could have drawn the line; it could 
have given guarantees against the violent change of political borders in the Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe. NATO could have given guarantees to the states that were already 
under attack and to those who faced the possibility of an attack, because of the ethnic 
hatred and geopolitical rivalries between some of the newly independent states in Europe. 
NATO was the only organization capable of giving such a guarantee, which was difficult 
to achieve politically, but it was militarily achievable, since NATO is a real military force 
of Europe.
It is interesting that NATO, at the Rome Summit in 1991, originally did not find it 
necessary to mention the situation in Yugoslavia, which was breaking apart in the big-
gest war in Europe since the Second World War. NATO perceived the war in Croatia as 
an internal conflict outside its borders, which should not involve NATO’s engagement. 
Of course, this attitude was completely contrary to NATO’s objective to become one of 
the pillars of European security, which should be indivisible. NATO members finally ac-
cepted a declaration at the Rome summit on November 8, just ten days before Vukovar 
was destroyed and occupied by Serbian troops. Declaration did not state a condemnation 
of violence and war crimes committed in Croatia. This fact shows that the great powers 
had their political interests that did not allow the internationalization of Serbian aggression 
against Croatia. Since every decision in NATO must be reached by consensus, there was 
no possibility that NATO would intervene. These wars broke all international conven-
tions and conventions of civilized political action, and seriously damaged the confidence 
in the future of peaceful international relations, which seemed justified after the end of 
bipolarism. It has broken the political unity of Europe and clouded the achievements of 
political cooperation in the West.
The possibility that international order and cooperative relations could be transferred 
and introduced to the east of Europe, and even onto the states of the former USSR did not 
seem unrealistic at the beginning of the nineties. But the wars in the Balkans jeopardized 
this possibility. Presumption that the war and cruelty were something that was natural for the 
Balkans influenced the USA and the West in a sense that they did not want to get involved 
in war. By doing this, they were indirectly involved in ethnic cleansing (Pfaff, 1993) 
All peace plans practically legalized ethnic cleansing. And the risk that Albania and 
Hungary would find themselves involved in the war was not negligible. It took NATO 
three years to intervene in Bosnia, but it was an intervention that was, from the military 
aspect, unimportant. If it were not for the Croatian victories in 1995, the political map 
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of the Balkans would look very different than it looks today. Bosnia was stabilized after 
the Croatian victories and weak interventions of NATO, which allowed the genocide in 
Srebrenica to occur. But Bosnia was not given the prospects for normal functioning and a 
stable future. It still represents a state of three nations that do not want to live together, and 
Bosnian Serbs are pushing for a referendum on separation from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and they want to proclaim their own state.  Kosovo proclaimed its independence on Febru-
ary 17, 2008, nine years since NATO’s military intervention successfully stopped ethnic 
cleansing done by Serbian troops against Albanians in Kosovo. Serbia is, and it probably 
will, for a long time, be unsuccessfully dealing with the complete loss of Kosovo. NATO’s 
intervention against Serbia in 1999 finally showed that NATO actually was accountable 
as one of the pillars of European security. It was a first out-of-area operation conducted 
by NATO, and it showed various possibilities of NATO’s actions.
GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY PREDOMINANCE OF THE USA AND ITS 
INFLUENCE ON NATO’S ENLARGEMENT
After the breakup of the USSR, the USA remained the only superpower. A completely 
new era of geostrategic relations has begun. A new geopolitical world-order started to 
develop, around the predominance of the USA, so maybe we could call it the American 
geopolitical world-order. The USA never seriously considered the possibility of NATO’s 
dissolution. Since the American vote in NATO usually was worth as much as all the other 
votes together, NATO’s future was secure. The administration of President Bush senior 
decided that it would continue to be actively involved in the European affairs, so it conti- 
nued the US political and military presence in Europe. Since the beginning, and especially 
from the middle of the nineties, appeals for the downsizing of US presence in Europe and 
more substantial involvement of Europeans in the projection of power started. That also 
meant transferring the burden of responsibility on Europe. We can also say that NATO 
enlargement would not have happened if it was not for Clinton’s administration and its will 
to enlarge NATO. All the key decisions which made even the debate about the possible 
enlargement possible, and the decisions that brought the first round of enlargement into 
being were made during the Clinton administration and were the result of the President’s 
will. The second round of the enlargement was simply a next logical step, like the third 
round of enlargement that started at the NATO Summit in Bucharest with invitations to 
Croatia and Albania to join the Alliance is the present logical step. The process is more and 
more becoming a sort of routine. But the first round and the initiative that came from the 
administration of the USA at that time were a factor that broke the deadlock and changed 
NATO from a Cold War military alliance toward a Post-Cold War security community.
At the beginning of the nineties, NATO was falling into a crisis, so it needed a change. 
It needed a strategy that would be capable of responding to challenges outside the borders 
of Western Europe, in the areas where regional problems were getting more and more 
difficult. The USA, as the only power that is capable of projecting and exerting strategic 
power, gave its allies the opportunity to enjoy these benefits without the real burden 
sharing. The use of NATO as a mechanism for the defense of Western interests was planned 
so that US allies would start to prepare for their projection of military power. This was 
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planned so that NATO would become capable for the exertion of power in the regions that 
were not in the reach of the Alliance before. These regions are Eastern Europe, Caucasus, 
Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. (Gompert, Kugler 1995)
However, the situation has not changed over the years, since the USA gave about 
90 percent of coalition troops in both Iraqi wars, in 1991 and 2003. We can conclude that 
US military predominance and European lack of capability to follow the USA in military 
spending and development continue to be a constant fact of transatlantic relations. 
THE INFLUENCE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON THE NEW MEMBERS
NATO encountered two enlargements in the Post-Cold War Era, accepting ten 
new members, former communist states and former Soviet republics. The first round of 
enlargement, in 1999, included three Central European states, Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. NATO membership grew from 16 to 19 states. The second round included 
seven states – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Membership of NATO rose from 19 to 26 states. The second round of enlargement brought 
NATO on Russian borders and established direct territorial contact between Hungary and 
rest of the Alliance. Greece and Turkey, across Bulgaria and Romania, were connected 
with the rest of the Alliance territory in Central Europe. NATO members surrounded the 
unstable region of the Western Balkans after the second round of enlargement. 
Tab. 1  Territory and population of ten new NATO members
Tab 1.  Teritorij i stanovništvo deset novih članica NATO-a
NATO member state Territory in square km
Population in 000 
(July 2007 est.)
Bulgaria 110 910 7 323
Czech Republic 78 866 10 229
Estonia 45 226 1 316
Hungary 93 030 9 956
Latvia 64 589 2 260
Lithuania 65 200 3 575
Poland 312 685 38 518
Romania 237 500 22 276
Slovakia 48 845 5 448
Slovenia 20 273 2 009
New NATO members 1 077 124 102 910
Reference: https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
By accepting ten new members, NATO enlarged its territory, as Table 1 shows, for 
over a million square kilometers, and the population of its members grew by approximately 
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103 million inhabitants. The two largest new member states, Poland and Romania, were 
responsible for about 55 percent of the territory and 60 percent of the population gained 
through the enlargement.
The enlargement was a part of the process of searching for new purpose of NATO, 
which was transforming itself from a military-political alliance whose primary purpose is 
territorial defense of its members to a security community that would act on the stabilization 
of the whole Eurasian area through new missions.
In the first half of the nineties, four states became front-runners for the possible NATO 
membership, if the enlargement would take place. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia were these front-runners, and the reasons for this were historical: They were 
part of Central Europe, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they are Catholic states which 
were forcibly occupied by Russians, and they belonged to the Central European cultural 
heritage. The reasons were also geographical, since The Czech Republic and Poland border 
Germany which is a member of NATO, Hungary and Slovakia bordered former USSR 
and today they border Ukraine; Poland as a gateway state of the whole region represents a 
land bridge or gateway between Central and Eastern Europe, it borders Germany, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Lithuania and a Russian exclave, the province of Kaliningrad. Poland, because of 
geographical proximity and historical experience felt most threatened by the possibility 
of renewed Russian imperialism, which could have created a new zone of influence and 
political and economic pressure. The Czech Republic and Hungary also perceived NATO 
as the best way to accomplish their own security. NATO membership was also Slovakia’s 
objective, although the support for this policy was lower than in the other three states. 
These four states together formed the Visegrad group, to promote their interests in front 
of the European and Euroatlantic institutions. The key factor of success for these four 
states was the position of the USA, as a leader of NATO. But, because of fears present 
in the West that focused on a new possible Russian imperialism, these states had to wait 
for more than five years, until 1997, when three states, except Slovakia, which was then 
under the authoritarian rule of Meciar, were invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit 
in July 1997.
The important geographical, strategic and political shift this enlargement, in two 
rounds, represented, brought this new NATO into the new Central Europe, into South 
Eastern Europe and beyond the borders of the former USSR, because the Baltic States 
became members. But this shift has a completely different meaning in this Post-Cold 
War Era than in the Cold War Era, when every shift from one side of the “Iron curtain” to 
another would meant almost certain possibility of continental, and possibly global nuclear 
war between the rival blocs. The geographical shift to the east and southeast of Europe 
puts NATO into a new position. It strengthens the northern, central and southern wing 
of NATO – if we can use this terminology today, when NATO on its new outer borders 
to the east1 borders the two states, Russia and Ukraine, which have cooperative relations 
with NATO of a different kind.
The enlargement gave NATO an opportunity to solve crises in their early stages. 
The enlarged NATO has a great military buildup and capabilities to intervene where it 
is necessary, before a crisis goes completely out of control. So we can state that NATO 
has greater possibilities for crisis management. The states of Central and Eastern Europe 
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represent a good and reliable land bridge towards the regions where interventions are and 
could be necessary, on the large area from the Baltic over to the Black sea, Caucasus, and 
the Middle East. The strategic value of the new NATO members, especially Romania 
and Bulgaria, was confirmed when the USA decided to wage wars against the regimes in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. US armed forces used the territory and air space 
of new NATO members. 
Another significant gain that NATO got from the enlargement was a broader mission 
of building unified and stable European security architecture. Besides giving security 
guarantees to its new members, NATO has to help some European states that might not 
become members, but they could represent a very important strategic gain for NATO 
and the security of Europe. The best example is probably Ukraine2. This new, enlarged 
NATO is also more capable to develop relations of active partnership with Russia, and 
this partnership brings improvements in security cooperation, so that Europe can become 
and stay a stable environment, as much as it can be. NATO enlargement also introduced 
the possibility that democracy and other values from the West spread even further to the 
East, so that they could influence the regimes in the former USSR. The proof of this can 
be seen in the authoritarian regime changes in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Besides that, the Partnership for Peace program gave an opportunity 
to those European states that wanted to remain neutral even after breakup of the Warsaw 
Treaty and were not its members, to participate in the European security architecture. 
For example, the neutral European countries: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and even 
Switzerland became members of the Partnership for Peace, and yet they never expressed 
a wish to become the members of NATO.
Central and Eastern Europe are so important for the security of Europe, that NATO 
would be forced to defend them, whether they were NATO members or not. Enlargement 
gave NATO a much better position in the defense of these states, with much less effort 
and spending. NATO membership also gave the states of Central and Eastern Europe an 
opportunity to reduce their defense spending, because when they became NATO members, 
they started to use security guarantees and benefits that the mighty Allies are giving them. 
By sending invitations to Albania and Croatia, at the Summit in Bucharest, in April 2008, 
NATO opened its door to the unstable region of Western Balkans. 
WHAT IS NATO TODAY BY ITS DEFINITION?
To open a discussion about the character of NATO today, we pose a question: What is 
actually NATO today? Is NATO a political and military alliance, is it a security community 
of Anglo-American and European states that are its members, is it maybe an organization 
of indivisible Western, liberal and postnationalist interstate community? Or has it simply 
become a means for pursuit of American geopolitical and geostrategic goals, which are 
mainly oriented towards the control of oil reserves in the Middle East, Caspian Sea and 
Central Asia? The real character of today’s NATO is probably somewhere in the middle. 
NATO is, by its definition a political and military alliance, based on the collective 
defense of its members. It protects its members and their security in the transatlantic area. 
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It has precisely defined the geographical area of its responsibility, which is written in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. But NATO in its new, out-of-area missions went out of the transatlantic 
area, and it conducts missions outside the territories of its members. Since it has started, 
through its security and partnership programs, to reach towards the non-member states 
(which are incorporated in Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and partnership 
with Russia through Joint Council and Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine), NATO has 
become a sort of security community. So we can state that NATO is evolving, it functions 
through its evolution and change, which is permanent. It evolves as the geostrategic relations 
in the world change, and it adapts itself to the new security challenges. 
If we define NATO as an organization of indivisible Western, liberal and post 
nationalistic interstate community, the following objections could be raised:
1)  NATO is a regional organization. Liberal, Western identity is universal, but 
NATO, like the EU, has in its documents a defined territorial reach and area of 
responsibility, and will not enlarge over the defined borders. NATO does not want 
to become a unified liberal or Western community, since it is not its meaning or 
intention of its member states. The region that NATO focuses on by its membership 
is the North Atlantic i.e. transatlantic area, and by its missions it focuses on the 
area of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. But that does not influence 
its identity;
2)  Regional identity is a second objection. NATO, besides European, includes the 
Anglo-American states – the USA and Canada, and the North Atlantic Ocean, 
and it represents the enlarged European i.e. Euroatlantic liberal community, and 
not the international community at large. NATO is the organization of European 
security, established with a purpose to defend Europe from Soviet threat. NATO 
is the main security organization of liberal Europe. The area that is included in 
the North Atlantic Treaty is the North Atlantic Ocean. The Pacific Ocean and the 
Caribbean Sea are not included, although they represent very important areas, 
regarding security, for the Anglo-American members of NATO. The North Atlantic 
Treaty claims that only European states can be invited into membership and the 
“Study on NATO Enlargement”, one of the official key policy documents of NATO, 
accepted in 1995, stated that the possible enlargements would be conducted as one 
of the elements of broader evolution of European cooperation and security. The 
regional perspectives of NATO and the EU, regarding enlargement, are actually 
very similar, considering the area that they try to incorporate;
3)  NATO is based on liberal norms and multilateralism, and it represents a typical 
interstate organization which functions on the principles of negotiating and 
agreements that leave the sovereignty of member states almost intact, so it is not 
a unified community;
4)  Religious culture is the fourth objective, since NATO and the EU have their 
origins in the states whose societies belong to Western Christianity. Although 
there is a difference between Western and Eastern Christianity in Europe, and 
of course between Christianity and Islam, these lines of division are today not 
key factors of division in Europe, because NATO and the EU have, through their 
enlargements, overcome these dividing lines. Other criteria matter today. States 
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that geographically belong to Europe, no matter what religion and culture they 
belong, have to fulfill the criteria that NATO and the EU put in front of them 
if they want to become members. By this we mean liberal values and norms. 
(Schimmelfennig 2003)
THE REAL CHARACTER OF NATO: A TOOL FOR FULFILLMENT 
OF GEOPOLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE USA, OR A SECURITY 
COMMUNITY?
By enlarging its territorial reach, and going "out-of-area" to the areas that are 
considered strategically important and that represent territories where security threats come 
from, NATO has fulfilled the geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of the USA and of 
some of its other members. But the real and more important question is: Has this change 
brought more or less security to NATO members than before? The other question that we 
have to ask and try to find the right answer is: Why has enlargement been so successful 
and why is a trend of further enlargement still present? This is a question that can not be 
answered with one argument. If we accept the basic presumption that NATO’s foundations 
exist well beyond the military and defense area, the chances for its survival and long-term 
future seem much higher. The existing members and candidate countries want to use all the 
benefits from being part of this hegemonic alliance. They simply bandwagon and become 
the allies of the hegemon, which in this case is the USA. The high level of institutiona- 
lization brings benefits like stability of Europe, conflict prevention, crises management 
and coordination of national security policies. These benefits reach much further than 
geopolitical reasons. (Risse-Kappen 1995, 1996; Walt 1997) 
However, if we want to understand NATO‘s persistence after the Cold War, we 
must turn to international institutionalist theories to explain why, contrary to neorealist 
expectations, NATO remains the key international security institution for its members. 
(McCalla 1996)
The mentioned views also have a strong opposition in form of views that identify 
a large degree of disagreements in the influence on decision-making process. The other 
argument they use is the shift in NATO’s area of interest, and missions, which has shifted 
completely out-of-area in the regions of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. 
These areas are of the most important US strategic interest. The question that is important 
to ask here is: Are some Europeans using the current global policy of the USA so they 
could use the hegemon, which is under criticism for its action, to fulfill their strategic 
objectives, which are basically similar to those of the hegemon? Or is this opposition to 
American hegemony and establishment of control over the strategically important areas 
really authentic? Probably the truth lies somewhere in the middle, since we can not look 
at all the European allies through the same perspective. Smaller European states are us-
ing the American hegemonic position and security guarantees when they enter NATO, 
since neutrality would cost them at least three times more and they would not be using 
the security guarantees that NATO gives them. 
Here we have to draw the line between NATO before and after September 11. We 
also have to draw the line between American global policies, whose goal of global lead-
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ership has become a pursuit for global hegemony with direct territorial control of stra-
tegically important areas, where the oil reserves are located, have started to fulfill after 
George W. Bush became President of the USA, and especially after September 11, in a 
sense that was unprecedented until then. The ways of fulfilling these goals have changed. 
They have become much more militaristic. (Kupchan 2002) 
The degree of how much the USA is willing to go in fulfilling these goals has also 
changed, at the same time destroying the fragile stability of the Middle East. We also 
have to draw a distinction between justifiability of the intervention in Afghanistan and in 
Iraq, since the intervention in Iraq probably had nothing to do with the struggle against 
terrorism. (Johnson 2004) NATO’s different views about these operations were shown in 
the inability to make decision by consensus and participate in the attack on Iraq in 2003, 
which was not the case with Afghanistan, where NATO is leading the ISAF, a stabilization 
force in Afghanistan. 
However, we can say that commitments that were taken in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(by training Iraqi forces) are a result of a new consensus in NATO, which includes the shift 
of NATO’s area of interest and shift in NATO’s missions outside of Europe. It commits 
NATO to the development of capabilities, especially strategic, to be able to fulfill these 
kinds of missions. (Aybet 2004)
The new missions of NATO, which were in focus of the debates during the nineties, 
became especially important after September 11. Article 5, which is a core of the North 
Atlantic Treaty giving NATO the right to use collective defense3, became active for the 
first time in history. NATO proclaimed the state of war with terrorists that were responsible 
for the September 11 attacks. The main security challenges for NATO today are terrorism, 
proliferation and of course possible use of weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs 
and human trafficking and ecological catastrophes. At present and in the near future, 
a conventional attack of large scale on any NATO member is highly unlikely. But these 
new security challenges can just as badly damage the territories of the member states, 
and hurt their population. What is really needed is a cooperation between all elements of 
security sectors of the member states and beyond that, involvement of all parts of society 
in giving support to the struggle against terrorism. The problem of dealing with these 
new security challenges is a problem of choosing between hard, military power and soft 
power, and the USA has to balance its use of hard and soft power, as well as unilateralism 
and multilateralism. (Nye 2002)
Discrepancy between American global policy, especially after September 11 and Iraq 
intervention, and foreign and security policy of the European Union, which has different 
priorities and means of solving the problems, has already caused problems in the functioning 
of the transatlantic alliance, and it could cause more problems in the future. (Parsi 2003)
The USA found new allies in Europe in new NATO members, and all new NATO 
members so far have become members of the EU. In security matters, they are oriented 
toward the USA and NATO, not towards the EU. The mission in Afghanistan has shown 
that NATO’s geographical area of interest and actions has spread very far from Europe. 
There is also Darfur mission, where NATO gives its support. NATO also trains and equips 
Iraqi military personnel, but outside of Iraq, in its training centers.  Discrepancy between 
American military power and the military power of all other allies in NATO has extended 
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so much that it poses real difficulties in the functioning of NATO. When we add American 
unipolarism and its unilateral action in Iraq to this, we can say that NATO will face serious 
challenges in the future.
After the relative success in South Eastern Europe, the future of NATO could be 
oriented towards establishing security after the conflict has ended, instead of missions that 
would be oriented towards conflict prevention or termination. This possibility generates 
fears because this division of missions between the two sides of Atlantic would leave 
Europe in a position of cleaning up behind the American military interventions. Without a 
serious strategic thinking in NATO and the EU, Europe could really face this possibility.
The USA, with couple of its real allies would have a possibility to wage real war 
when they wanted, and NATO would provide peace making and peace keeping forces 
and send them to missions outside of Europe. The European Union would be responsible 
for police forces and society building after a conflict would end and the country was 
stabilized. A better way would be a balanced responsibility and burden sharing for global 
security. (Haass 1999)
After September 11, and especially after the Iraq intervention, and all the problems 
in transatlantic relations and division among the NATO members it has caused, we can 
say that NATO has again, for the second time after the Cold War, changed itself. Only the 
formal structure remains the same. Besides including ten new members, huge changes also 
happened in the internal relations among the allies, in NATO’s objectives and missions. The 
characteristics of this new NATO are now: strong American unipolarism and the pursuing 
of geopolitical and geostrategic goals outside of NATO, the struggle against terrorism by 
military means and interventions, deteriorated relations between some of the allies.
After the Istanbul summit, held in 2004, relations between the two sides of the Atlantic 
have improved, and the USA also realized that it could not follow a completely unipolar 
policy. The European allies realized that they have to improve their own relations, and 
not base them on their relation towards American global policy. The situation during the 
Iraqi crisis, when NATO’s functioning was blocked, was one of the results of American 
unipolar policies. NATO was for a long time considered the most important alliance where 
the USA participate, and its unity and strength were really weakened and tested because of 
the transatlantic division over Iraq. The international action that the USA started, through 
efforts on making an international coalition, ended in a fiasco. American power was at its 
peak, and its political and moral authority at the bottom. This great division in transatlantic 
relations threatened to make NATO unimportant, and maybe even redundant, because it 
would lose its ability to act and the meaning of its existence. (Gvosdev 2002, 2004)
Lacking political unity, the decisiveness of the USA, the political and military 
weakness of the EU, joined with a slow decision-making process in the field of foreign 
and security policy, badly influence the possibility of joint actions. These differences 
are sometimes even described as natural and as something that cannot and would not be 
changed. (Kagan 2003)
Even if we leave the problems in Asia aside, since they should be out of the scope 
of transatlantic cooperation, at least two significant strategic challenges lie in front of 
the allies, and they demand transatlantic cooperation. The first strategic challenge is the 
transformation of states that are geographically located on the eastern borders of new 
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NATO and EU members, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans. The most important examples 
are Ukraine’s stabilization, improved democratization and stronger orientation to the 
West, and regime change, democratization and opening of Belarus to the West. The West 
also has to help Russia to continue its transformation to become a democratic, modern, 
and western-oriented state, which would also be a strategic partner. The second strategic 
challenge is the development and implementation of a new strategy towards the states of 
Caucasus and Central Asia, former Soviet Republics, which face security and political 
challenges and economic difficulties. The success of the West in integrating the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe gave a certain hope to those states, that they have a chance 
for greater cooperation with NATO and the EU. Aspirations of those states should be 
supported, since the West needs a coherent strategy for the Black and Caspian Sea regions, 
together with Central Asia. 
During the 20th century, Europe was a region where the greatest challenges to 
international security originated. At the beginning of the 21st century, this region is the 
broader region of the Middle East, and the biggest threats to the security of the USA 
and European states and their populations come from there. Therefore, the West has to 
develop a strategy that would successfully break the current status quo. The West has to 
be actively involved in the transformation of these societies, so that they would no longer 
produce ideologies that promote terrorism, but it also has to change its relation towards 
the sovereignty, independence and natural resources of these states, because they do not 
belong to the USA or some European state. They belong to the people of the Middle 
East. A change in the relation of the West to the states of the Middle East and Northern 
Africa is necessary. By this, we mean that NATO, as a part of the Western community has 
to change its relationship towards the region. It is doubtful if the USA and Europe can 
develop a common strategy that is able to respond to these challenges. Today, even the 
Americans admit that the problems that we have mentioned earlier pose a biggest threat 
to their common interests, but they do not agree about the way these challenges should be 
faced. NATO, as a transatlantic security community, and not just a political and military 
alliance, has to be included in the responses to the security challenges in the contemporary 
world. These challenges mostly arise in the broader region of the Middle East, which is in 
geostrategy also called the Arc of instability. But NATO’s response must not be identical to 
the American way of dealing with these problems, which includes the military occupation 
of independent states and regime changes, according to the will of the American political 
and military elite.
NATO must not allow itself to become a simple tool for the realization of geopolitical 
and geostrategic objectives of any state, not even the USA. By becoming a simple tool, 
NATO would ruin its legitimacy, which could never be restored. If NATO, as an alliance, 
went for military occupation of Iraq, together with the USA and some of the NATO members, 
it would have posed an irreversible step towards becoming a sort of “supermarket” of the 
USA, which would use it for fulfilling its geopolitical and geostrategic objectives. Even 
in the current situation, NATO permanently suffers from the perception that it is used as 
a mechanism, which serves for the recovery and stabilization of the states that the USA 
attack, and occupy.
If the USA wants to change the ways they address the security challenges and respond 
to those challenges differently, Washington has to express its support to the strong, unified 
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and pro-Atlantic Europe, and abandon its policy of dividing the Europe on the Old and 
New Europe, as former American defense minister Rumsfeld called the two groups of 
states of Europe4. The model of establishing the “coalitions of the willing” and dividing 
Europe has to fail, there is not any doubt about that. The main dilemma is whether the 
USA, as the stronger partner in the transatlantic partnership, will show enough willingness 
to find an acceptable balance between the unilateral pursuit of the American interests and 
constructive cooperation with allies and institutions in the international arena. Or will the 
USA simply superimpose its will in the international arena, probably sacrificing the moral 
authority that it used to have?
If Washington wants Europe to take more responsibility for security, it has to start 
treating Europe as unified. That kind of Europe could take a real responsibility. The lesson 
that everybody has to take from the crisis in transatlantic relations is that every attempt 
of building a unified Europe on the basis of anti-Americanism leads to the division of 
Europe. American power is a possibility, and not a problem, so it should be used in the 
right way. (Asmus, 2003)
Europe has to address the problems of current multilateral institutions in a realistic 
manner. US unilateralism and coalitions of the willing are not the answer. But those 
Europeans, who insist on the use of the United Nations, at the time when this institution is 
not capable to fulfill its missions, are also not realistic. In reality, there is a huge disproportion 
between the problems in the World and the capability of international institutions to resolve 
them. Therefore, both sides of the Atlantic have to find new solutions, either through 
building new institutions or through radical reform of the existing ones. 
CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Cold War Era, NATO has undergone a deep internal transformation. 
From a military and political alliance that faced the possibility of becoming a relic of Cold 
War, it has become a mixture of an alliance and a security community. By broadening 
and deepening its activities, objectives and missions and by changing its structure, NATO 
has adapted itself to the new strategic conditions and realities, so that it can successfully 
address the security challenges of the contemporary, Post-Cold War Era. By enlarging 
itself in two rounds, NATO accepted ten new members, and now it has 26 members. 
Two more states, Albania and Croatia, were invited to join the Alliance at the Summit in 
Bucharest. The political balance in NATO has shifted towards the USA, consensus as a 
decision-making rule was seriously put into question, and NATO on the Baltic Sea reached 
Russian borders. NATO got closer to the regions of Black Sea, Caucasus, encircled the 
problematic Western Balkans region and created a land bridge towards the regions of the 
Middle East and Central Asia. The key problem for NATO in the future will be defining 
its role and position in transatlantic relations, and a challenge that it could become a tool 
for fulfilling the American geopolitical and geostrategic objectives. If NATO faces this 
challenge, it must resist the possibility to operate militarily in the interest of the USA, 
which is mainly oriented towards gaining and keeping control of oil and gas reserves, 
pipelines and strategic maritime locations. NATO must not also allow itself to become a 
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tool that will be used for operations of cleaning and stabilization of states that were the 
objects of the US military interventions. The lesson of the crisis in relations between 
the USA and Europe is that the USA and Europe need each other, and NATO is the only 
institution in military and security field, where representatives of both sides participate and 
make decisions by reaching a consensus. Therefore, NATO is a necessity. It should not be 
a NATO as current American official policy would like it to be, but the NATO where the 
USA and Europe would treat each other as equal partners.
NOTES
1. By this, we consider the borders of new NATO members that are not borders with the rest of NATO members 
that are neighbors – so we don’t include borders like Bulgarian-Greek border, Bulgarian-Turkish border, 
Slovenian-Italian border, Poland and Czech Republic borders with Germany etc.
2. Ukraine represents a huge geopolitical gain for NATO or Russia, if they would succeed to pull it into its 
own bloc. Ukraine is a state divided between its western, pro-European and pro-NATO part and its eastern, 
pro-Russian part. In less than four years, Ukraine had turbulent changes of government and elections that did 
not broke the status quo and nevertheless did not resolve the question of Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation. 
At the NATO summit in Bucharest, the USA and some of the allies tried to give Ukraine (together with 
Georgia) an invitation to the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which represents one step further towards the 
NATO membership. But the consensus among the allies on the issue could not be reached, mainly because 
the core European states want to have good relations with Russia, which strongly opposes Ukrainian and 
Georgian membership in the MAP.
3. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, by 12 states, the founders of NATO. 
The states that founded NATO were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
4. Rumsfeld used the term Old Europe when he referred to the states in Europe that did not support American 
intervention and occupation of Iraq. By using the term New Europe, he referred to those NATO and EU 
members that supported the USA in its unilateral policy. Many of the latter were new members of NATO 
and EU.
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SAŽETAK
Proširenje NATO-a: Geopolitička pobjeda SAD-a u post 
hladnoratovskom razdoblju? Rezultati i perspektive
Petar Kurečić
Post hladnoratovsko proširenje NATO-a, u dosad provedena dva kruga, predstavlja najveću i 
najvažniju geopolitičku promjenu u Europi, nakon geopolitičke tranzicije koja se u Europi odigrala 
u razdoblju od 1989. do 1991. g. Treći krug proširenja, koji uključuje Hrvatsku i Albaniju, otvoren je 
davanjem pozivnica ovim državama na Summitu NATO-a u Bukureštu u travnju 2008. g. Proširenje 
je bilo i još uvijek jest dio preobrazbe NATO-a u post hladnoratovskom razdoblju u kojem je NATO 
evoluirao iz tradicionalnog vojno-političkog saveza u kombinaciju saveza i sigurnosne zajednice. 
Proširenje je također bilo i jest izraz američke pobjede u hladnom ratu i uzdizanja SAD-a u jedinu 
svjetsku supersilu. NATO je povećao svoj teritorijalni obuhvat, promijenio svoje misije, sposobnosti 
i ciljeve, te ih nastavlja mijenjati kako bi ostao spreman odgovoriti na buduće sigurnosne izazove 
koji se postavljaju pred njegove članice. Najveći izazov NATO-u u budućnosti mogao bi doći 
iznutra, a to je mogućnost da postane sredstvo američke globalne geostrategije i njenih ciljeva. Ako 
NATO želi ostati legitimnim savezom i izrastati u sigurnosnu zajednicu, ne smije postati sredstvo 
za ispunjavanje geopolitičkih i geostrateških ciljeva samo jedne države, pa čak ni SAD-a. Stoga je 
u odnosima SAD-a i Europe potreban uravnotežen pristup, prema kojem SAD ne bi koristile vojnu 
moć kako bi nametale svoje geopolitičke i geostrateške ciljeve pod svaku cijenu.
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